In quantum weak oblivious transfer, Alice sends Bob two bits and Bob can learn one of the bits at his choice. It was found that the security of such a protocol is bounded by 2P * Alice + P * Bob ≥ 2, where P * Alice is the probability with which Alice can guess Bob's choice, and P * Bob is the probability with which Bob can guess both of Alice's bits given that he learns one of the bits with certainty. Here we propose a protocol and show that as long as Alice is limited to individual measurements, then both P * Alice and P * Bob can be made arbitrarily close to 1/2, so that maximal violation of the security bound can be reached. It is also shown that the security bound can still be violated for some limited collective attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Oblivious transfer (OT) [1, 2] is known to be an essential building block for two-party and multi-party protocols [3] . However, unconditionally secure OT was shown to be impossible even in quantum cryptography, because the adversary can always cheat with the so-called honestbut-curious attack [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . To evade the problem, the concept "weak OT" was proposed recently [9] , in which the security goals of OT is slightly modified, so that the honest-but-curious attack is no longer considered a successful cheating. Even so, it was found that a security bound exists for weak OT [9] , so that it cannot be unconditionally secure either.
Nevertheless, we will point out below that the cheating strategy to weak OT has its own limitation too. By making use of this limitation, we can build quantum weak OT protocols which will violate the existing security bound when the cheater is restricted to individual measurements as well as some limited collective attacks. Therefore, while in principle the security bound still applies to our protocols, in practice the attack will be very difficult to be implemented.
Note that previously there was already a quantum OT protocol [10] which was considered secure against individual measurements [11] . However, the protocol calls for quantum bit commitment as a building block, thus its security is unreliable [12, 13] .
In the next section, we will review the definitions of OT and weak OT, and the existing security bound of the latter. Our protocol will be proposed in section III. Section IV is dedicated to the security analysis. We will show why the security bound still applies in principle. On the other hand, we will elaborate how to reach the maximal violation of the bound when only individual measurements are allowed. It will also be shown that the bound can still be violated for limited collective attacks. Some ideas on further improvement of our protocol will be discussed in section V. * Electronic address: hegp@mail.sysu.edu.cn
II. DEFINITIONS AND THE SECURITY BOUND
There were many variations of OT. The most wellknown ones are all-or-nothing OT [1] and one-out-of-two OT [2] . Here we are interested on the latter, which is defined as follows [14] .
One-out-of-two OT (i) Alice knows two bits x 0 and x 1 . More rigorously, this definition indicates that a secure protocol should guarantee that at the end of the process, Bob should gets x b with reliability 100%, i.e., the value he decoded matches Alice's actual input with certainty. Meanwhile, the amount of information he gains on xb should be arbitrarily close to zero, so that he has to guess xb by himself, which results in a reliability 50% for xb since his guess stands a probability 1/2 to be correct. However, as pointed out in [15] , in the literature there is the lack of a self-consistent definition of OT specifically made for the quantum case. This is because with quantum methods, it is possible that Bob may accept a lower reliability for x b , so that the reliability for xb can be significantly raised. This is exactly what the honestbut-curious attack [4] [5] [6] [7] achieves. In the above definition it is vague whether such a result is considered as successful cheating, making it hard to discuss the security of OT protocols in a precise way.
To mend the problem, weak OT is proposed [9] , with an improved definition on Bob's cheating. Define the symbols P Note that P * Alice , P * Bob ≥ 1/2 for every protocol, as a cheating party can do no worse than a random guess. Then weak OT is defined as a kind of one-out-of-two OT which requires security only against cheating-Bob who gets one of honest-Alice's bits with certainty.
Note that the names "Alice" and "Bob" were used reversely in [9] , comparing with the literature on QOT [1, 3-8, 10, 11, 14-17] . Here we follow the literature and use the names in the above way.
It was proven that the optimal security bound for any quantum weak OT protocol is [9] 2P *
from which it follows that one of the two parties must be able to cheat with probability at least 2/3.
III. THE PROTOCOL

A. Limitation of the cheating strategy in existing protocols
Intriguingly, while the security bound 2P * Alice +P * Bob ≥ 2 indicates that in a protocol where Bob cannot cheat (i.e., P * Bob = 1/2), Alice can guess Bob's choice b at least with the probability P * Alice = 3/4, we must note that her cheating strategy has a serious drawback. That is, once Alice applies the cheating, she will not be about to determine the values of x 0 , x 1 . For example, consider the Chailloux-Kerenidis-Sikora (CKS) protocol proposed in Sec. 4 of [8] (also presented in Sec. 3.2 of [9] with reverse usage of the names "Alice" and "Bob"), as described below.
The CKS protocol 1. Bob randomly chooses b ∈ {0, 1} and prepares the two-qutrit state |φ b = (|bb + |22 )/ √ 2. He sends the second qutrit to Alice.
2. Alice chooses x 0 , x 1 ∈ {0, 1} and applies the unitary transformation
3. Alice returns the qutrit to Bob who now has the state |ψ b = [(−1)
Bob performs the measurement
If the outcome is Π 0 then Bob learns with certainty that x b = 0, if it is Π 1 then x b = 1, otherwise he aborts.
This protocol can reach P * Bob = 1/2, but it is insecure against Alice's individual attacks. As shown in Sec. 4 of [8] , Alice's optimal cheating strategy is simply to measure the qutrit she received in step 2 using the computational basis. If she gets outcome |0 (|1 ) then she knows with certainty that b = 0 (b = 1). If she gets outcome |2 then she guesses the value of b. Therefore in average, Alice can learn Bob's b correctly with the probability P * Alice = 3/4. After the measurement she returns the measured qutrit to Bob. Then Bob's state will be either |bb or |22 . With any of these two states, the outcome of Bob's measurement in step 4 will always be either Π 0 or Π 1 . Hence he will never abort, so that Alice's cheating cannot be detected at all.
However, we can see that Alice cannot control, nor she can learn what will be the actual outcome of Bob's measurement in step 4, because |bb and |22 can both be projected as Π 0 or Π 1 . As a result, at the end of the protocol Bob gets a bit x b , but its value is unknown to Alice. That is, once a dishonest Alice gains the information on b, she loses the information on x b .
In fact, besides the CKS protocol, some other QOT protocols [16, 17] have this feature too. Let (3/4, 1/2)-protocol denote any QOT protocol of this kind, i.e., both P * Alice = 3/4 and P * Bob = 1/2 are satisfied exactly, and Alice cannot determine x b once she gets b. It will be shown below that though a (3/4, 1/2)-protocol merely saturates the security bound 2P * Alice + P * Bob ≥ 2, it can be utilized to construct a compound protocol which can eventually violate this bound when Alice is limited to individual attacks.
B. Our protocol
Our method is to use such a (3/4, 1/2)-protocol as a building block, with which Alice transfers a series of bits x Protocol A: weak OT for transferring (x 0 , x 1 ) A1. Alice and Bob discuss and agree on a set S of classical n-bit strings.
A2. Alice chooses two strings
from S. Note that at this stage, none of these x
1 have any specific relationship with the two final bits x 0 , x 1 (we call them as target bits thereafter) that Alice wants to transfer to Bob as the goal of the weak OT.
A3. For each i (i = 1, ..., n), Alice transfers x
to Bob using a (3/4, 1/2)-protocol. A4. Security check: among all these n runs of the (3/4, 1/2)-protocol, Bob picks m runs randomly. For each of these runs, he asks Alice to announce x 
C. A concrete example
To make our protocol easier for understanding and analyzing, here we provide a concrete example of our above protocol where the CKS protocol is used as the (3/4, 1/2)-protocol and the explicit form of set S is given.
Protocol B: a concrete example B1. Alice and Bob run the CKS protocol for n = 3k times. Every 3 runs of the CKS protocol are grouped together and we call it as a triple run. Let x and
cannot be completely random. Instead, they are required to be chosen within the set S = {000, 001, 010, 100}.
B2. Security check: for every triple run, Bob randomly picks two runs of the CKS protocol, denotes them as the i 1 -th and i 2 -th runs. The remaining run that is not picked is denoted as the i 3 -th run. Bob asks Alice to reveal x
= 0 then Bob marks the corresponding triple run as a useful run, as both x can either be 0 or 1 according to the definition of set S, so that they may potentially be used for encoding the target bits x 0 , x 1 later. Else if any of x
too, and checks whether both
belong to set S. He also checks that none of Alice's announced values conflicts with what he decoded from the CKS protocol.
B3. If Alice's data passes the above check, Bob picks one of the useful runs and asks Alice to complete the weak OT using this run. Then Alice announces x 0 ⊕ x (i3) 0 and
to Bob, so that he can obtain either the target bit x 0 or x 1 depending on whether he has obtained x
IV. SECURITY A. The collective attack
The above protocols A and B are, unfortunately, still restricted by the security bound 2P * Alice + P * Bob ≥ 2 if Alice has unlimited computational power to apply collective attacks. Taking Protocol B as an example, her cheating strategy is as follows.
In step B1, for each triple run Alice introduces a 6-qubit system C = c 
where the first (last) three qubits are corresponding to the string X 0 (X 1 ). That is, it is a superposition of all the states allowed by set S.
In the i-th run (i = 1, 2, 3) of the CKS protocol during a triple run, let β (i) denote the second qutrit of Bob's two-qutrit state φ
Alice. Alice uses c
1 as control qubits to determine her transformation on β (i) . That is, she applies on c
).
By doing so, Alice manages to finish the transformation (3) it can be seen that Alice's announcement will never conflict with the values Bob decodes from the CKS protocol. Now remind that a useful run is defined as the triple run where x
Therefore by combining equations (2) and (3), we know that the state of c
of any useful run at the end of step B2 becomes
If a useful run is picked for the security check in step B4, Alice can simply measure the qubits c correctly. On the other hand, if a useful run is picked in step B3 to encode Alice's target bits x 0 , x 1 , then she will have the freedom to choose whether to measure c 
We can see that if Alice finds the outcome of her measurement on c are |+ , thus she has to guesses the value of b by herself. Therefore, the average probability that Alice can learn Bob's b correctly is still P * Alice = 3/4, which is the same as that of the original CKS protocol.
B. Security against individual attacks
However, the above cheating requires the computational power to perform collective operations on many qubits/qutrits. More rigorously, equations (2) and (3) indicate that at the end of step B1, in every triple run Alice needs to make 6 qubits and 3 qutrits entangled together, even if Bob's half of his two-qutrit states is not counted. Here we will show that if Alice is limited to individual measurements, then the protocol can be secure.
In this scenario, during each run of the CKS protocol, Alice is not allowed to perform collective operations to entangle the qutrit she received from Bob with her ancillary system anymore. What she can do is either to perform unitary transformations (either honest or dishonest ones), or to measure Bob's qutrit individually then returns him another one. The former case will provide no information on Bob's b to Alice since no measurement is performed. In the latter case, no matter what individual measurement Alice may adopt, as the qutrit Alice returns to Bob is prepared by herself locally, it will not entangle with the other qutrit at Bob's side. Therefore, the two-qutrit state Bob owns at step 3 of the CKS protocol will not be either |φ b = (|bb + |22 )/ √ 2 or |φ ′ b = (|bb − |22 )/ √ 2 with certainty. As a result, at the end of the CKS protocol both x b = 0 and x b = 1 can occur with non-vanishing probabilities. And it is determined by the uncertainty in quantum measurements, which Alice cannot control so that she will not know with certainty the value of x b that Bob actually obtained. Then if this run of the CKS protocol is picked for the security check in Protocol B, Alice will stand a nonvanishing probability ε (ε > 0) to announce a wrong value of x b . Since at the end of Protocol B, n − 1 runs of the CKS protocol will be checked, the probability for Alice to pass all the checks successfully will be at the order of magnitude of (1 − ε) n−1 . It can be made arbitrarily close to zero by increasing n. For this reason, Alice cannot cheat with individual measurements, so she can only get Bob's choice bit b by guess, which can be correct with the probability 1/2. Thus the value of P * Alice in our Protocol B is arbitrarily close to 1/2. On the other hand, Bob's cheating probability remains the same as that of the CKS protocol. This is because in any useful run, the values of x
that Alice revealed are always 0. As set S is defined as S = {000, 001, 010, 100}, any value of x 1 from all the other runs. Consequently, Bob still has to decode the target bits via the corresponding run of the CKS protocol, without any help from other runs. Therefore, his cheating probability in our Protocol B is still P * Bob = 1/2, as what can be obtained in a single run of the original CKS protocol [8] .
Putting things together, we can see that when Alice is limited to individual measurements, in our Protocol B 2P * Alice +P * Bob can be made arbitrarily close to 3/2, which is the maximal violation of the security bound 2P * Alice + P * Bob ≥ 2 since the minimums for P * Alice and P * Bob are both 1/2.
C. Security against limited collective attacks
If Alice is allowed to perform collective operations but it is restricted to a limited number of quantum systems only, then the security bound 2P * Alice + P * Bob ≥ 2 can also be violated to a certain degree.
Suppose that Alice's collective operations are limited to 1 qutrit and 2 qubits, i.e., the qutrit β (i) that Bob sends to her and the two qubits c
1 that she introduces as ancillary systems. She can still apply the transformation defined in equation (3) for cheating. Our discussion below will remain valid as long as c
are not allowed to be entangled with the control qubits c
, and each of c
1 is restricted to a single qubit, instead of a high-dimensional system that equivalent to many qubits.
In this case, if Alice still keeps all x
1 (i = 1, 2, 3) at the quantum level, then any one of them can turn out to be either 0 or 1 during the measurement in the security check. The outcome is determined by quantum uncertainty, which is out of Alice's control. As the triple runs are executed many times, there will inevitably be a triple run, in which Bob will find in the security check that X 0 or X 1 turns out to be 011, or 101, etc., which is not a legitimate value in set S. Thus he can detect Alice's cheating with a high probability by increasing the number k of the triple runs.
To avoid being caught, Alice has to apply the cheating with a lower probability p < 1. That is, only the values of x
1 in pn (p < 1, n = 3k) runs of the CKS protocol are kept at the quantum level. The rest (1 − p)n runs are executed honestly, i.e., x
1 are assigned with a deterministic classical values in step B1 beforehand, so that Alice can ensure that the values of both X 0 and X 1 are presented in set S. Then no matter Alice can pass the security checks with certainty or not, any run of the CKS protocol dishonestly executed will only have the probability p to be chosen in step B3 for encoding the target bits x 0 and x 1 to complete the weak OT. Even if Alice can still learn Bob's b with the probability 3/4 for such a single dishonest run, the probability for (this run to be chosen) and (b is learned correctly) will drop down to (3/4)p. In the rest (1 − p) occasions where an honestly executed run is chosen for encoding the target bits, Alice can only guess Bob's b which stands the probability 1/2 to be correct. Therefore, the total probability for Alice to cheat successfully in our Protocol B is bounded by
which is lower than that of the original CKS protocol. Meanwhile, Bob's cheating probability still equals to that of the CKS protocol, i.e., P * Bob = 1/2, since the specific x
finally chosen for encoding the target bits x 0 , x 1 are not affected by any x
1 from all the other runs, as it is elaborated in the previous subsection. Combining this P * Bob with equation (6), we can see that under the limited collective attack, our Protocol B can obtain
which still violates the security bound 2P * Alice + P * Bob ≥ 2 since p < 1.
V. POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS
It is easy to show that p in equation (7) cannot be made arbitrarily small in our Protocol B. Alice can cheat with the following strategy. In every triple run, she only keeps one pair of x 1, 2, 3 ) at the quantum level by using the collective operation described by equation (3) . The other two pairs of x
1 are all taken as 0 beforehand, and the corresponding two runs of the CKS protocol are executed honestly. Then all triple runs can pass the security check with certainty. Meanwhile, when a useful run is finally picked for encoding the target bits, the pair x
kept at the quantum level stands a probability 1/3 to be chosen. Thus we have p = 1/3, and equation (7) then indicates that Protocol B is lower bounded by
even if Alice is restricted to the above limited collective attack. However, we can see that this lower bound is due to the specific set S used in Protocol B, which is made of 3-bit strings only. In the more general form, i.e., our Protocol A, we can expect that choosing a more complicated set S may further reduced the value of p. For example, set S can be chosen as a classical error-correcting code, e.g., the binary linear (n, k, d)-code [18] . That is, S is taken as a set of classical n-bit strings. Each string is called a codeword. This set of strings has two features. (a) Among all the 2 n possible choices of n-bit strings, only a particular set of the size ∼ 2 k (k < n) is selected to construct this set. (b) The distance (i.e., the number of different bits) between any two codewords in this set is not less than d (d < n). With these features, it can be expected that by increasing n while fixing k/n and d/n, a dishonest Alice will have to introduce a much larger number of entangled control qubits for keeping more pairs of x will appear as legitimate strings in set S no matter which bits are picked for the security check. Therefore with a properly chosen S, Protocol A may further lower the successful probability of limited collective attacks, and also raises the difficulty of implementing these attacks. However, the rigorous security bound will depend heavily on the structure of the specific set S used in the protocol, and we would like to leave these analyses for future researches.
VI. SUMMARY AND REMARKS
Thus we show that the security bound 2P * Alice +P * Bob ≥ 2 for weak OT can be violated for an Alice with limited computational power. As a rigorously checkable example, we proposed Protocol B which reaches the maximal violation 2P * Alice +P * Bob → 3/2 when only individual measurements are allowed. For attacks using collective operations on a limited number of quantum systems, there can still be P * Alice < 3/4 while P * Bob = 1/2. An even lower value of P * Alice could be expected from Protocol A. While the current security level is much inferior to unconditional security, it still has great practical significance. This is because in practice, any quantum storage devices can keep the quantum states faithfully for a limited time only. Suppose that τ is the maximal storage time available with state-of-the-art technology. Then during step B1 of Protocol B, Bob can require that every run of the CKS protocol is separated from each other by a time interval larger than τ , so that any ancillary system that an dishonest Alice may introduce to entangle with Bob's qutrit will suffer from errors, making Alice unable to pass the security check. In this case, Alice has to finish the measurement on Bob's qutrit (if she does not want to perform the honest unitary transformation) in each single run of the CKS protocol before the next run begins. Thus her cheating is actually reduced to individual measurements. So we can see that as long as our protocol is proven secure against individual measurements, then it is naturally implies that we can use it as a secure protocol in practice.
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